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Two people get married, have two children, and a few years later sit 
on opposite sides of a courtroom while a judge attempts to divide 
what remains of their marital assets.1  The husband sold the most 
valuable marital asset, the marital home, just prior to the parties’ 
separation.2  He sold the house without his wife’s knowledge and 
spent the entire proceeds from this sale.3  In response, the wife 
brought a claim of dissipation4 against her husband, asking the judge 
to remedy the situation in the final division of marital property.5  The 
                                                          
 1. See generally Plaintiff’s Pre-Trial Memorandum, Rizkallah v. Clem, No. FL 
42872 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County Md. July 22, 2005) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Pre-
Trial Memorandaum] (detailing the circumstances under which a divorce claim 
arose). 
 2. See id. at 1 (describing the circumstances around the husband’s sale of the 
marital home, where the home was in his control and titled only in his name). 
 3. See id. at 1-2 (illustrating how the husband spent the proceeds of the sale on 
such items as attorney’s fees, truck repairs, and rent for a lease-back agreement he 
signed with the new owners of the marital home). 
 4. See infra Part II(B) (defining dissipation as one spouse using marital property 
for his or her sole benefit for a purpose unrelated to the marriage at a time when the 
marriage is undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown). 
 5. See Plaintiff’s Pre-Trial Memorandum, supra note 1, at 13 (seeking a remedy 
in the form of one half of the proceeds from the sale of the home). 
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judge pointed out that half of the proceeds from the sale of the house 
went to pay the husband’s legal fees stemming from the divorce 
proceeding, and, according to the recent Maryland decision in Allison 
v. Allison,6 marital funds spent on attorney’s fees are a valid 
expenditure of marital funds that do not constitute dissipation.7  
Therefore, a court will not consider the funds that the husband spent 
on attorney’s fees when making its property distribution.8  
Consequently, the wife could not afford to pay for her own 
representation and was left with very limited assets from the little that 
remained in the marital estate.9 
This Comment argues that allowing a spouse to spend marital funds 
for individual attorney’s fees leads to inequitable property distribution 
if the court does not account for these expended assets in the estate at 
divorce.  Furthermore, courts should account for these transactions 
through the dissipation doctrine to prevent spouses from effectively 
paying for half of an expenditure that is clearly against their interests 
and significantly reduces the value of the estate to be divided.  Part II 
of this Comment provides the background on the doctrine of 
equitable distribution of property in divorce, the doctrine of 
dissipation as it pertains to equitable distribution, and how courts 
approach the problem of dissipation.10  It also discusses the split in 
authority between states regarding whether attorney’s fees constitute 
dissipation of marital assets.11 
Part III argues that attorney’s fees should constitute dissipation for 
the purposes of property distribution. Specifically, Part III(A) 
illustrates how a unilateral transaction for attorney’s fees fits the 
                                                          
 6. See Allison v. Allison, 864 A.2d 191, 196 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (reasoning 
that the husband’s use of marital funds to pay for attorney’s fees was not dissipation 
because his purpose in spending the funds was to avoid representing himself in the 
divorce action). 
 7. See id. (stating that while reasonable attorney’s fees did not constitute 
dissipation, unreasonable attorney’s fees would constitute dissipation). 
 8. See Memorandum of Laura Rizkallah Regarding Allison v. Allison at 1, 
Rizkallah v. Clem, No. FL 42872 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County Md. Sept. 6, 2005) 
[hereinafter Memorandum of Laura Rizkallah] (noting the judge’s prior statement to 
plaintiff’s council that he would not consider the funds spent by the husband on 
attorney’s fees as dissipation because of the precedent set by the Allison case). 
 9. See Allison, 864 A.2d at 196 (holding that attorney’s fees were an acceptable 
expenditure of marital funds because a husband had no other funds besides marital 
funds from which to pay the attorney’s fees). 
 10. See infra Part II (detailing how ideas of property distribution in divorce 
evolved from separate property rights and title theory to the theory of equitable 
distribution). 
 11. See infra Part II (discussing the split between states such as Maryland and 
Virginia, which hold that attorney’s fees do not constitute dissipation, with states such 
as Illinois and South Carolina, which hold that attorney’s fees do constitute 
dissipation). 
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definition of dissipation.12  Part III(B) argues that allowing a spouse 
to use marital assets to pay for his or her individual attorney’s fees is 
contrary to the idea of equitable distribution and the discretion courts 
traditionally retain in applying it.13 
Part III(C) explores other theories through which a court in equity 
can remedy a spouse’s use of marital funds for attorney’s fees, 
concluding that the doctrine of dissipation most effectively maintains 
equity in the outcome of the divorce.14 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Doctrine of Equitable Distribution: Marriage as an Equal 
Partnership 
The history of property division in American divorce law has 
evolved over time.15  The early American common law of divorce 
followed the English tradition in which the spouses’ separate property 
rights merged upon marriage into the legal entity of the husband.16  
In common law states, an eventual movement toward a more 
equitable distribution of property at divorce took hold.17  However, it 
was not until the early 1970s that a major adoption of far-reaching 
equitable theory in property distribution took place.18  In 1970, the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
adopted the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA).19  The 
                                                          
 12. See infra Part III(A) (applying a transaction for attorney’s fees to the 
definition of dissipation and concluding that it is a transaction where one spouse 
benefits for spending the funds on a non-marital purpose at a time when the 
marriage is breaking down). 
 13. See infra Part III(B) (analyzing the equitable distribution doctrine and 
reasoning that not allowing attorney’s fees to come under the distribution doctrine 
limits the courts discretionary power, allows one spouse to benefit, creates a higher 
burden of proof, and complicates the intent requirement of dissipation). 
 14. See infra Part III(C) (analyzing the theories of constructive trusts, fraud, and 
preliminary injunctions as other ways in which the court can retain equity in the 
property division). 
 15. See generally BRETT TURNER, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY 2-18 
(Patrick McCahill et al. eds., 1994) (describing the evolution of property distribution 
and title in American divorce law from common law merger of a husband and wife’s 
property under the husband, to the emergence of a community property system, to 
the doctrine of equitable distribution). 
 16. See id. at 3 (discussing how the common law merger in identities at marriage 
limited the property rights of the wife, who often times would only receive alimony at 
divorce). 
 17. See LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 46-49 (1985) (describing 
the gradual adoption of equitable distribution rules and changes in state divorce law). 
 18. See TURNER, supra note 15, at 14 (stating that New Jersey was the first state to 
adopt an equitable distribution statute in 1971, and the last state was Virginia in 
1982). 
 19. See Stephen J. Brake, Note, Equitable Distribution vs. Fixed Rules: Marital 
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UMDA codified the system of equitable distribution.20  Equitable 
distribution rests on the notion that marriage is an equal partnership, 
and, at divorce, each spouse is entitled to an equitable share of the 
marital property based on the spouse’s contributions to the 
marriage.21  Although most states have not formally adopted the 
UMDA, many have enacted statutes that provide for the equitable 
distribution of property in divorce using similar language.22  Other 
common law states that have not adopted formal equitable 
distribution statutes slowly adopted the doctrine of equitable 
distribution in marital property at common law.23 
The equitable distribution doctrine is based on the generally held 
idea of marriage as an equal partnership to which both spouses 
contribute.24  Equitable distribution states generally hold that each 
spouse has an equal claim to the marital property.25  These 
jurisdictions focus on what constitutes an equitable or “fair” 
distribution of property as opposed to simply dividing the assets in 
half.26  Many statutes list factors that a court should consider in an 
                                                          
Property Reform and the Uniform Marital Property Act, 23 B.C.L. REV. 761, 761 
(1981-82) (stating that the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws attempted to find a proper method through which to distribute property in 
divorce). 
 20. See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307 (amended 1973) (providing a 
template for codification of a property distribution scheme that divided property 
equitably without considering marital misconduct and without considering which 
spouse was the title holder to the property). 
 21. See Forcucci v. Forcucci, 83 A.D.2d 169, 171 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (stating 
that equitable distribution resulted from defining the marriage as an economic 
partnership). 
 22. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.58 (2005) (“Upon a dissolution of a 
marriage, . . . the court shall make a just and equitable division of the marital 
property of the parties without regard to marital misconduct[.]”); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 50-20 (2005) (“Upon application of a party, the court shall determine what is 
the marital property and divisible property and shall provide for an equitable 
distribution of the marital property. . . ”). 
 23. See, e.g., Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197, 1202-03 (Fla. 1980) 
(holding that the court had discretionary equitable authority in distribution of 
property). 
 24. See K. Edward Greene, A Spouse’s Right to Control Assets During Marriage: Is 
North Carolina Living in the Middle Ages?, 18 CAMPBELL L. REV. 203, 203 (1996) 
(stating that the concept of treating husband and wife as a partnership is evident at 
divorce according to North Carolina’s equitable distribution laws). 
 25. See Brake, supra note 19, at 767 (stating that equitable distribution does 
empower the courts to take into consideration the separate property of each spouse). 
 26. See Ex parte Drummond, 785 So.2d 358, 361 (Ala. 2000) (stating that 
property divisions do not need to be equal, but instead must be equitable in light of 
the facts of the case); see also Jenkins v. Jenkins, 781 So.2d 986, 988 (Ala. 2000) 
(stating that an equitable division of assets is not necessarily an equal division and 
holding that where an equal division of property would render husband’s business 
insolvent, the assets should be divided unequally so as to prevent an unfair outcome 
for the husband); Brewer v. Brewer, 846 A.2d 1, 17 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) 
(holding that the law did not require the court to divide marital property equally but 
only that the division must be fair and equitable). 
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equitable distribution decision.27  In addition to this list of statutory 
factors, courts in these states receive a tremendous amount of 
discretion in dividing property between the spouses.28  In many cases, 
because of the large amount of discretion given to the court, 
equitable distribution does not result in a fifty/fifty division of the 
party’s marital assets.29  One problem that inevitably arises in many 
cases is how to account for spousal expenditures of marital funds 
around the time of divorce when the court is attempting to separate 
property.30 
B. Dissipation: A Factor In Equitable Distribution 
A significant problem that arises under the theory that both spouses 
share an interest in property within a marriage is in the dissipation of 
those assets in anticipation of a divorce and property division.31  
Dissipation is commonly defined as one spouse using marital property 
for his or her sole benefit for a purpose unrelated to the marriage at a 
time when the marriage is undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown.32  
Courts’ views and responses to dissipation developed long before the 
                                                          
 27. See, e.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. CH. 750 §5/503 (2005) (listing duration of marriage, 
relevant economic circumstances of each spouse, and any obligations arising from a 
prior marriage of either party, as some of the factors that the court considered upon 
distribution); S.C. STAT. CODE ANN. § 20-7-472 (2004) (listing that the court should 
take into consideration marital misconduct, duration of the marriage, income and 
earning potential of the spouses, non-marital property of each spouse and health). 
 28. See Widman v. Widman, 557 S.E.2d 693, 701 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001) (holding 
that the court can use any means reasonable to determine an equitable distribution of 
property). 
 29. See, e.g., Isham v. Isham, 464 So.2d 109, 112 (Ala. 1985) (awarding 40% of 
the estate to the wife in an equitable distribution determination where wife had 
assisted husband in running his business); Roberts v. Roberts, 520 So.2d 598, 599 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (awarding the wife 58.7% of the marital home value where 
she provided the sole initial capital investment in the property and the remaining 
mortgage payments were made jointly by both spouses); Burbes v. Burbes, 739 S.W.2d 
582, 585 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (awarding the wife 57% of the marital estate where the 
wife had little education or work experience because the husband had encouraged 
her to stay home). 
 30. See TURNER, supra note 15, at 467-77 (stating that asset-related misconduct 
has become more common as the general public becomes aware that all property is 
subject to division); see also Lewis Becker, Conduct of a Spouse That Dissipates 
Property Available for Equitable Property Distribution: A Suggested Analysis, 52 OHIO 
ST. L. J. 95, 95-96 (1991) (asserting that there has been an increase in equitable 
distribution claims by one spouse alleging that the other spouse has in some way 
interfered with the amount of property available for equitable distribution by 
mismanaging or misusing the property). 
 31. See Becker, supra note 30, at 96 (stating that a variety of difficult issues arise 
as to the extent to which a court can protect a spouse from conduct of the other 
spouse regarding marital property). 
 32. Sharp v. Sharp, 473 A.2d 499, 506 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (discussing 
various jurisdictional definitions of dissipation and effectively agreeing upon the 
definition that Illinois courts granted). 
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equitable distribution doctrine’s viability.33  Under the theory of 
dissipation, the court may take property that no longer exists within 
the marital estate into consideration when dividing the estate as 
though the property still existed in front of the court.34  Dissipation 
has become a more prevalent issue in distribution of assets over time 
and is now commonly incorporated into state equitable distribution 
statutes.35  Most states list dissipation of assets as a factor that courts 
should take into account when making an equitable distribution.36  
The technical definition of dissipation is not given in the state 
statutes, but instead is found in state case law, where most states have 
almost identical definitions and elements of dissipation.37 
The doctrine of dissipation falls under the court’s broad discretion 
in distributing the marital estate.38  Dissipation is often analogized to 
fraud that one spouse commits against another.39  However, proving 
dissipation does not require the same elements as proving fraud.40  In 
                                                          
 33. See, e.g., Oles Envelope Corp. v. Oles, 65 A.2d 899, 903 (Md. 1984) (holding 
that a conveyance by a husband in anticipation of his wife’s suit for alimony was 
fraudulent); Levin v. Levin, 171 A. 77, 78 (Md. 1934) (finding that intentionally 
dissipated property constitutes a fraud on marital rights). 
 34. See Becker, supra note 30, at 97-99 (listing the ways in which a court may take 
dissipated property into consideration by either considering it as a factor in dividing 
the remaining property or by offsetting the property by considering the property as 
though it still exists for distribution and assigning it to the dissipating spouse). 
 35. E.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. CH. 750 §5/503 (2005) (stating that the court can look at 
the dissipation of marital and non-marital property as a consideration in equitable 
distribution); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (2005) (listing the use of marital property by 
either of the spouses for nonmarital separate purpose or dissipation of funds, as a 
factor to consider in equitable distribution). 
 36. See, e.g., LAWRENCE J. GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY 259 
(1983) (stating some states have statutes that specifically say courts can consider 
dissipation or fraudulent conveyances as factors in distribution, while other state 
statutes allow for considering dissipation through a statutory catch-all factor or listing 
a factor that allows consideration of contributions to the preservation of marital 
assets). 
 37. See, e.g., In re Marriage of O’Neill, 563 N.E.2d 494, 498-99 (Ill. 1990) (listing 
the elements of dissipation as the expenditure of a spouse for a non-marital purpose 
that is for his or her sole benefit when the marriage is undergoing irreconcilable 
breakdown). 
 38. See Lori D. Hall, Dissipation of Marital Assets: How South Carolina and Other 
States Prevent and Remedy the Problem, SOUTH CAROLINA LAWYER, May/June 1999, at 
42 (stating that South Carolina law lets family court judges consider how spouses 
handle marital property when making an equitable distribution); see also Richard W. 
Zuckerman, Dissipation of Marital Assets In Illinois: A Review, 91 ILL. B.J. 440, 441 
(2003) (stating that Illinois courts can remedy the innocent party’s dissipation by one-
half of the value of the dissipated property either through a cash award or other 
marital property). 
 39. See Sharp, 473 A.2d at 505 (citing Levin v. Levin, 171 A. 77 (Md. 1934) 
(quoting “Therefore, where a chancellor finds that property was intentionally 
dissipated in order to avoid inclusion of that property towards consideration of a 
monetary award, such intentional dissipation is no more than a fraud on marital 
rights”) (emphasis added). 
 40. See TURNER, supra note 15, at 479 (stating that courts do not require proof 
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most jurisdictions, the spouse alleging dissipation of assets bears the 
initial burden of proving dissipation.41  Once a spouse makes a prima 
facie case for dissipation, the burden shifts to the other spouse to 
prove the reasonableness of his or her expenditures.42 
Usually, determining whether a transaction falls under the doctrine 
of dissipation will depend on the nature and timing of the 
transaction.43  Courts will often focus on whether or not one spouse 
benefited or was unjustly enriched by the transaction.44  Courts will 
typically find dissipation where one spouse spent marital funds for his 
or her benefit when the marriage was falling apart, and the 
transaction affects the funds available for distribution.45  Often, the 
court must decide whether a particular expenditure constitutes a 
“necessity of life,” such as basic living expenses once spouses physically 
separate, and when those expenditures constitute dissipation.46  Once 
one spouse shows a prima facie case of dissipation, the allegedly 
dissipating spouse must then mount a defense in which he or she 
presents sufficient evidence and receipts of how the assets were spent 
and that the expenditure was reasonable.47 
                                                          
that the dissipating spouse acted with fraudulent intent in order to hold that the 
spouse dissipated assets). 
 41. See Jeffcoat v. Jeffcoat, 649 A.2d 1137, 1142 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) 
(stating that the spouse alleging dissipation has the initial burden of proof and needs 
to establish a prima facie case in order to shift the burden). 
 42. See id. at 1142 (holding that a wife established a prima facie case for 
dissipation where she claimed that her husband borrowed funds in the couple’s name 
and placed the funds in accounts under his own name, spending approximately 
$300,000 in marital funds during the one year period of the couple’s separation 
thereby shifting the burden); Clements v. Clements, 397 S.E.2d 257, 261-62 (Va. 
1990) (remanding the issue when the wife established a prima facie case, and the 
lower court held that there was no dissipation even though the husband provided no 
evidence in regards to the disposition of the allegedly dissipated funds). 
 43. See TURNER, supra note 15, at 479-88 (discussing what a court considering 
dissipation will look at, such as the purpose of the transaction, whether it fits the 
definition of marital or non-marital purpose, and whether or not the transaction 
occurred before or after the marital breakdown). 
 44. See Allgood v. Allgood, 473 So.2d 416, 421 (Miss. 1985) (discussing the 
prevention of unjust enrichment in a marital relationship). 
 45. See TURNER, supra note 15, at 483-84 (stating that a majority of courts find 
dissipation where spouses make gifts to their children); see, e.g., Hellwig v. Hellwig 
426 N.E.2d 1087, 1095 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (finding dissipation where a husband 
transferred funds and real estate to the parties’ son). 
 46. See Volesky v. Volesky, 412 N.W.2d 750, 752 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding 
that if a party uses assets to meet necessary living expenses, he or she is not 
accountable for dissipation of those funds); Judy v. Judy, 998 S.W.2d 45, 52 (Mo. Ct. 
Spp. 1999) (holding that funds spent for payment of marital bills, both parties’ debts, 
and support for both parties did not constitute dissipation); Thomas v. Thomas, 580 
S.E.2d 503, 506 (Va. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that expenditures out of marital funds 
for everyday items and necessities of life is a valid marital purpose and is not 
considered dissipation). 
 47. See Amburn v. Amburn, 414 S.E.2d 847, 850 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (holding 
that wife met her burden of proof by presenting a complete account of how she used 
8
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C. Equitable Remedies for Dissipation 
Courts have a number of different remedies they can implement to 
account for spouses’ transactions near the time of divorce.48  In a 
typical dissipation remedy, the court will simply treat the expended 
asset as though it still existed within the estate and will account for the 
funds in the equitable distribution by including the extant property in 
the equitable share of the spouse who spent the funds.49  A court 
could also impose a constructive trust on assets within the marriage.50  
The court will use the remedy of constructive trust where a fiduciary 
duty exists between the spouses as the result of a confidential 
relationship, and one spouse controls an asset for the benefit of the 
marriage as a whole and will be unjustly enriched if he or she is 
allowed to dispose of the asset.51  A court can also remedy a 
dissipation situation by rescinding the entire transaction if they find 
that the transaction was fraudulent.52  A finding of fraudulent 
conveyance requires that the court determine that a spouse and the 
third party in the transaction of marital funds acted with a fraudulent 
intent.53  A court can use a preliminary injunction on marital assets to 
attempt to pre-empt dissipation altogether.54  A preliminary 
injunction freezes marital assets and prevents a spouse from using 
them while the court is in the process of distributing the estate.55 
                                                          
the allegedly dissipated funds and therefore had not committed dissipation). 
 48. See TURNER, supra note 15, at 467-70 (setting out the element’s of fraud and 
constructive trust as remedies a court may employ in given situations to retain equity 
in the divorce). 
 49. See In re Marriage of Walls, 925 P.2d 483, 486 (Mont. 1996) (including $5000 
dissipated by the wife in her share of the estate as though the asset still existed). 
 50. See Tomaino v. Tomaino, 68 A.D.2d 267, 269-70 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) 
(imposing a constructive trust on real property owned by the husband when the wife 
had advanced funds toward the improvement of the real estate). 
 51. See id. (holding that a constructive trust existed because the husband owned 
the real property for the benefit of the marriage and that the wife relied, due to the 
confidential relationship within the marriage, on her husband to maintain the 
property). 
 52. See Patterson v. Patterson, 277 S.E.2d 709, 718 (W.Va. 1981) (setting aside the 
husband’s conveyance of his business to his daughter as fraudulent, where he 
retained power of attorney and control over the business operations). 
 53. See Gaudio v. Gaudio, 580 A.2d 1212, 1223-24 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990) (ruling 
that the trial court was correct in holding a stock transfer by husband to a third party 
fraudulent and that the wife needed to show fraudulent intent in order to prove 
fraud). 
 54. See Kahn v. Kahn, 559 N.Y.S.2d 103, 104 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (stating that 
wife sought a preliminary injunction to stop her husband from spending marital 
property in his control during the divorce proceedings where husband controlled 
over $5 million in assets). 
 55. See id. at 105-06. (refraining from granting a preliminary injunction on 
marital assets in the husband’s control, where the court decided that freezing the 
assets might actually result in more harm).  
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D. Are Attorney’s Fees Dissipation?: A Split Between States 
A split in state authority exists regarding whether the use of marital 
funds to pay a spouse’s unilateral attorney’s fees constitutes 
dissipation of assets.56  Some states hold that the use of marital funds 
to pay one party’s divorce attorney’s fees constitutes a dissipation of 
marital assets, reasoning that either the expenditure was not a marital 
purpose or that it was for the sole benefit of one spouse.57  Other 
jurisdictions hold that such action does not constitute dissipation 
because attorney’s fees are a necessity and the funds are spent for a 
marital purpose, the divorce; thus, it is reasonable.58 
In the recent case, Allison v. Allison, a Maryland court without 
precedent on the issue held that no dissipation of marital assets 
occurred.59  In arriving at its conclusion, the court cited various state 
authorities and a legal article supporting the view that attorney’s fees 
should not constitute dissipation, so long as the fees were 
reasonable.60  The court reasoned that because Maryland law 
considers a spouse’s earnings a marital asset throughout the 
separation period, any expenditure for attorney’s fees would derive 
from the marital estate.61  Therefore, regardless of which marital asset 
                                                          
 56. Compare Head v. Head, 523 N.E.2d 17, 21 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that a 
portion of the husband’s attorney’s fees constituted part of the wife’s share of the 
estate when she was forced to borrow money to pay for her attorney’s fees, and as 
such was dissipation), and In re Marriage of Walls, 925 P.2d 483, 486 (Mont. 1996) 
(holding that the attorney’s fees the wife spent to procure the divorce constituted a 
dissipation of assets that required consideration when dividing the marital assets), 
with Decker v. Decker, 435 S.E.2d 407, 412 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that 
expenditures for living expenses and attorney’s fees constitute a valid marital purpose 
and are not dissipation), and Hortis v. Hortis, 367 N.W.2d 633, 636-37 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1985) (holding that it was reasonable for the wife to spend marital funds on 
attorney’s fees because seeking a divorce did not constitute an improper purpose, 
and, therefore, the expenditure did not constitute dissipation). 
 57. See Head, 523 N.E.2d at 21 (holding the husband’s use of marital funds to 
pay attorney’s fees was dissipation when the wife had to borrow money to pay for her 
attorney’s fees); In re Marriage of Walls, 925 P.2d 483, 486 (Mont. 1996) (including 
the wife’s payment of retainer to her attorney in her share of the marital estate). 
 58. See Expenditures For Attorney’s Fees As Dissipation: Spending Marital Funds 
For Attorney’s Fees, 15 No. 8 EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION J. 85 (1998) [hereinafter 
Expenditures] (listing authority from several states holding that attorney’s fees do not 
constitute dissipation). 
 59. See Allison, 864 A.2d at 196 (holding that reasonable attorney’s fees do not 
constitute dissipation where husband used marital funds in a 401(k) plan to pay for 
his attorney’s fees). 
 60. See id. at 195-96 (pointing out that jurisprudence in Illinois and Virginia 
differs as to whether or not attorney’s fees constitute dissipation and relying on an 
article on the topic, reasoning that attorney’s fees should not constitute dissipation 
because a spouse should not have seek alternative sources of funds that are non-
marital in order to pay for an attorney). 
 61. See id. (illustrating that under Maryland law if a separated spouse used his or 
her own income before the court finalized the divorce decree, technically that 
expenditure would derive from marital funds). 
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the funds derived from, attorney’s fees were a reasonable expenditure 
and did not meet the definition of dissipation.62  The court held that 
in distributing the couple’s assets under the theory of equitable 
distribution, it would not value the money that the husband spent on 
legal fees as part of the marital estate.63 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Expenditures for Attorney’s Fees Fit the Dissipation Definition 
Attorney’s fees first need to be examined in the context of a 
dissipation claim.  An analysis and application of the common law 
definition of dissipation indicates that expenditures for attorney’s fees 
fit the definition of dissipation.64 
1. Use of Marital Property for a Spouse’s Sole Benefit 
The first requirement for a dissipation claim is that the expending 
spouse uses the funds for his or her sole benefit.65  Payment of 
attorney’s fees from marital assets can solely benefit the expending 
spouse.66  One spouse spends the funds on his or her own attorney 
for purposes of a divorce action. The attorney only protects the 
interests of the hiring spouse regarding the financial division of the 
estate and in the non-financial matters of securing the actual 
divorce.67  The result is that one spouse benefits from expending 
marital funds when he or she uses those funds to protect individual 
interests in the divorce and property division.68  Divorce litigation 
                                                          
 62. See id. (holding that the husband’s $13,665.31 expenditure on attorney’s fees 
did not meet the court’s definition of dissipation as it derived directly from what the 
court considered cash property of the marital estate). 
 63. See id. (valuing the pension plan from which the attorney’s fees derived at 
$15,569, as opposed to the $29,235 value before the funds were spent). 
 64. See generally In re Marriage of Delarco, 728 N.E.2d 1278 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) 
(holding that the husband’s expenditures for his attorney’s fees were dissipation, 
noting that Illinois law considers spouses’ payments to their attorneys personal not 
marital debt, and, therefore, the payments are advances from the marital estate 
because they are for one spouse’s benefit during the breakdown). 
 65. See, e.g., McCleary v. McCleary, 822 A.2d 460, 469-71 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2001) (holding that the husband’s charitable donation, derived from marital assets, 
did not constitute dissipation). 
 66. See In re Marriage of Schriner, 410 N.E.2d 572, 576 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) 
(calculating that the $2000 the husband had liquidated and spent on attorney’s fees 
was dissipation and that he benefited by spending $1000 to which the wife was legally 
entitled). 
 67. See Allison, 864 A.2d at 196 (stating that one of the obvious purposes for 
spending marital funds on attorney’s fees was so the husband could avoid 
representing himself in the divorce action). 
 68. See Head, 523 N.E.2d at 21 (holding that the husband’s attorney’s fees paid 
out of marital assets resulted in an inequitable benefit to him and as such constituted 
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creates an adversarial situation.69  Protection of one spouse’s interests 
is not the only effect of hiring an attorney; it also directly pits these 
interests against the conflicting interests of the other spouse.70  
Therefore, a spouse using marital funds to pay for attorney’s fees 
benefits from the protection and representation of his or her 
individual interests.71 
In states that do not consider attorney’s fees to constitute 
dissipation, a numeric breakdown reveals that the expending spouse 
receives an actual nominal benefit from the transaction.72  Allison 
demonstrates this unfortunate trend.  The alleged dissipation was in 
the amount of $13,665 out of a marital asset valued at $29,235 before 
the transaction for attorney’s fees occurred.73  After the transaction, 
the asset was worth $15,569.74  Each spouse received 50% of the 
balance of the asset or $7,784.75  The court effectively split the 
husband’s costs between himself and his wife, for a purpose that 
entirely protected his own interests.76  He benefited from the 
transaction, while his wife did not.77 
                                                          
dissipation, where his wife borrowed money to pay her attorney’s fees). 
 69. See generally WEITZMAN, supra note 17, at 46-49 (discussing the evolution of 
no-fault divorce which eliminates the adversarial situation with respect to marital 
fault; however, even in the no-fault context, attorney’s fees have increased regarding 
property distribution due to the necessity to value and distribute the assets equitably). 
Given that one party’s receipt of a marital asset constitutes the other party’s loss, 
property division is inherently adversarial upon divorce. Id. 
 70. See Ray v. Ray, 336 S.W.2d 731, 738-39 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960) (holding that the 
husband’s expenditures for attorney’s fees were antagonistic to the wife’s interests 
and therefore that she should receive her equitable share of the expended funds). 
 71. See Brake, supra note 19, at 775-77 (discussing individualized justice and 
spouses' individual interests in property considered in equitable distribution awards). 
 72. See, e.g., Anderson v. Anderson, 514 S.E.2d 369, 380 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) 
(illustrating that the husband received a monetary benefit when he withdrew $15,288 
from marital funds valued at $18,744, some of which he spent on attorney’s fees, 
where only the remaining account balance was available for distribution). 
 73. See Allison, 864 A.2d. at 194 (stating the undisputed fact from the lower court 
that the 401(k) plan from which Mr. Allison withdrew funds was valued at $29,235 at 
the time he made the withdrawal). 
 74. See id. (detailing the calculation Mr. Allison made to counter the value of the 
asset that the trial court decided by subtracting his $13,665 withdrawal from the 
$29,235 value of the 401(k)). 
 75. See id. at 196 (ruling in favor of Mr. Allison’s calculation of the proper 
amount each spouse was entitled to receive from the 401(k) based on the holding 
that his expenditure for attorney’s fees did not constitute dissipation). 
 76. See id. (reasoning that Mr. Allison’s expenditure for attorney’s fees was to 
avoid having to represent himself and his own interests, where Mrs. Allison was 
seeking alimony and other assets). 
 77. See id. at 194-96 (permitting the cost of Mr. Allison’s attorney’s fees to 
decrease the amount of both spouses’ share of the 401(k) account instead of taking it 
out of his share of the initial value of $29,235, which resulted in Mrs. Allison receiving 
about 50% less from the 401(k) asset). 
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2. Use of Marital Property for a Purpose Unrelated to the Marriage 
Courts are reluctant to give the term marital purpose a particular 
concrete definition.78  The overall authority suggests that a marital 
purpose constitutes a transaction that is typical or normally flows from 
the marriage entity.79  Expenditures on attorney’s fees are not a 
typical or normal expense within a marriage and do not come into 
play in the finances of a marriage until the marriage is breaking 
down.80  Attorney’s fees are in essence an expenditure that is the 
opposite of a marital purpose.81  In the context of divorce, an 
individual spends attorney’s fees when the court is in the process of 
dividing up the marital estate and creating two separate entities out of 
the assets, dissolving the marriage.82  Therefore, upon divorce the 
partners incur attorney’s fees for the purpose of ending the marriage, 
not maintaining or benefiting the marital partnership.83  Attorney’s 
fees are also distinguishable from typical marital expenditures because 
they are significant in amount and “one time” in nature.84 
3. Marital Funds Spent During an Irreconcilable Breakdown 
Dissipation for equitable distribution purposes can only occur when 
the marriage is falling apart and heading toward eventual separation 
                                                          
 78. See Becker, supra note 30, at 111-16 (discussing expenditures and categories 
courts define as a marital or non-marital purpose, such as distinguishing one time 
gifts given to third parties and loans made for various purposes as non-marital 
expenditures, as compared to routine living expenses, which typically constitute funds 
spent for a marital purpose). 
 79. Compare In re Marriage of Calisoff, 531 N.E.2d. 810, 815 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) 
(reversing the trial court’s finding of dissipation where there was evidence that the 
marital funds were spent on an income tax lien on the marital home and other living 
expenses), with Klingberg v. Klingberg, 386 N.E.2d 517, 521 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) 
(reasoning that the husband’s use of marital funds to pay child support to his former 
wife, for which he was not in arrears, was dissipation because it was an atypical 
expenditure for a purpose unrelated to the current marriage). 
 80. See Booth v. Booth, 371 S.E.2d 569, 573 (Va. Ct. App. 1988) (noting that the 
husband’s complaint on appeal argued that the court should consider the $86,000 
spent by the wife on attorney’s fees and living expenses, which she removed from 
marital assets at the time of separation). 
 81. See Ray, 336 S.W.2d at 738-39 (holding that attorney’s fees resulting from the 
divorce proceedings were dissipation because they were spent not for a joint purpose, 
but for a purpose that was antagonistic to the wife). 
 82. See Palmer v. Palmer, 841 So.2d 185, 189 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (voicing the 
idea of severance of the relationship as a main goal in divorce and property 
distribution, so that husband and wife could begin separate lives). 
 83. See In re Marriage of Toth, 586 N.E.2d 436, 440 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (holding 
that the wife’s $12,000 expenditure for attorney’s fees was dissipation, and the wife 
admitted that the fees paid to her attorney for the divorce litigation constituted a 
purpose that was unrelated to the marriage). 
 84. See WEITZMAN, supra note 17, at 48 (discussing the high attorney’s fees 
associated with divorce in equitable distribution states, and the strain this can place 
on a spouse trying to obtain access to cash to pay for lawyer’s retainers and discovery 
fees). 
13
Acker: All's Fair in Love and Divorce: Why Divorce Attorney's Fees Shoul
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2006
160 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 15:1 
and divorce.85  Attorney’s fees, in the divorce context, only arise at the 
final stages of breakdown.86  In the context of divorce, parties hire 
legal assistance to end the marriage and distribute the assets; 
therefore, attorney’s fees clearly meet this requirement for a finding 
of dissipation.87  Attorney’s fees for divorce proceedings do not exist 
unless the irreconcilable breakdown required for a finding of 
dissipation already occurred.88 
Jurisdictions holding that attorney’s fees are not dissipation still 
find that attorney’s fees satisfy this particular element of dissipation.89 
4. Intent 
At common law, the majority of states hold that a spouse’s state of 
mind or intent is irrelevant as to whether or not dissipation 
occurred.90  Evidence of a bad faith intentions and state of mind can 
result in a more clear-cut case of dissipation, but it is not a 
prerequisite.91  The intent to spend the funds for a non-marital 
purpose is usually sufficient for a finding of dissipation.92  The 
                                                          
 85. See generally In re Marriage of Hazel, 579 N.E.2d 1265 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) 
(stating that the court could consider the irreconcilable breakdown as the prolonged 
and gradual process starting with the initial signs of trouble in the marriage until the 
actual breakdown and divorce itself). In this case, the husband and wife had a history 
of marital problems for a number of years before the actual separation and divorce. 
Id. 
 86. See generally Francka v. Francka, 951 S.W.2d 685 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) 
(holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the dissipation 
occurred when the husband spent significant amounts of marital funds on his 
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses resulting from the filing of the divorce action). 
 87. See Expenditures, supra note 58, at 85 (stating that it is entirely appropriate 
for couples facing divorce to obtain legal advice needed to distribute marital assets). 
 88. See In re Marriage of O’Neill, 563 N.E.2d. 494, 499 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) 
(holding that an expenditure for attorney’s fees to defend a husband against a 
criminal charge that occurred at a time when the marriage was not undergoing 
irreconcilable breakdown did not constitute dissipation). 
 89. See Anderson v. Anderson, 514 S.E.2d 369, 380 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (holding 
that the burden rested on the husband to prove he spent marital funds after the 
breakdown for a proper marital purpose, but the attorney’s fees he spent over the 
course of the divorce constituted a valid post-separation expense). 
 90. See, e.g., E. E. C. v. E. J. C., 457 A.2d 688, 695-96 (Del. 1983) (holding that a 
husband dissipated assets because his business produced assets of over $400,000 
during the seventeen year marriage, yet at the time of divorce he had a negative net 
worth). The court found dissipation regardless of the fact that the husband claimed 
that his transactions did not have the requisite intent to satisfy the level of dissipation. 
Id. See also TURNER, supra note 15, at 479 (stating that dissipation does not typically 
depend on the state of mind of the dissipating spouse.)  For example, proving a 
fraudulent intent is not required for a finding of dissipation. Id. 
 91. See, e.g., Barriger v. Barriger, 514 S.W.2d 114, 115 (Ky. 1974) (finding a clear 
case of dissipation, despite the absence of explicit showing, where the husband sold 
$25,000 in stock after his wife informed him that she was filing for divorce and not 
accounting for the money that he testified he spent on gambling trips and vacations). 
 92. See Klingberg v, Klingberg, 386 N.E.2d 517, 517-18 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) 
(reasoning that dissipation occurred because the expenditure was made for a non-
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intention of any spouse in retaining legal counsel for a divorce is to 
ensure protection of his or her own individual interests in the divorce 
and division of property.93  In spending marital assets on attorney’s 
fees, a spouse intends to secure his or her own personal interests 
separate from that of the marriage.  Specifically, the divorcing spouse 
intends to spend marital funds for the protection of his or her 
individual interests and dissolve the marriage entirely during the 
irreconcilable breakdown.94  This construction of intent derived from 
the facts and circumstances involved in a divorce proceeding should 
be sufficient to demonstrate the element of intent necessary to find 
dissipation.95 
B. Holding That Attorney’s Fees Are Not Dissipation Results In 
Outcomes That Conflict with the Purpose of Equitable Distribution 
The doctrine of equitable distribution is a vital tool for separating a 
marital partnership into two distinct, separate entities and allowing 
the divorced parties to achieve a complete, final, and fair outcome.96  
Allowing one spouse to unilaterally spend marital funds on attorney’s 
fees without allowing the court to consider the transaction in the 
property division is in conflict with the equitable distribution 
doctrine.97 
                                                          
marital purpose of paying child support from a previous marriage). 
 93. See Little v. Superior Court of Arizona, 884 P.2d 214, 215-16 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1994) (demonstrating a spouse’s individual interest upon securing a divorce attorney 
where the husband argued that it was necessary that he obtain legal services in the 
divorce to protect his rights in the divorce proceeding and because the expense 
constituted a “necessity of life” which the injunction on marital assets did not 
preclude). 
 94. See Allison v. Allison, 864 A.2d 191, 196 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (stating 
that the husband’s obvious purpose of spending funds for attorney’s fees was to avoid 
having to represent himself and protect his interests where his wife sought indefinite 
alimony). 
 95. See In re Marriage of Walls, 925 P.2d. 483, 486 (Mont. 1996) (finding that the 
trial court properly held the wife responsible for the $5000 in attorney’s fees that she 
incurred during the divorce for the purpose of protecting her interests in the 
divorce). 
 96. See In re Marriage of Lakin, 662 N.E.2d 617, 620 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) 
(declaring that trial courts should distribute property to establish a high degree of 
finality so that the spouses do not feel the need to return repeatedly to the courts and 
can rely on the finality of the outcome to plan accordingly for their financial future). 
 97. See In re Marriage of Mouschovias, 831 N.E.2d 1222, 1229 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) 
(affirming the trial court’s denial of the wife’s post-trial motion for reconsideration 
where the husband spent $184,324 of marital funds on attorney’s fees and only 
divided the remainder of the estate in the divorce because the wife had not raised a 
dissipation claim at trial). 
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1. Excluding Attorney’s Fees From Dissipation Incorrectly Places 
Limits on the Court’s Discretionary Authority Under Equitable 
Distribution 
What is equitable and fair does not always constitute an equal 
division of the marital estate.98  The reason that so many states use the 
model of equitable distribution is because it gives the court broad 
discretionary power.99  It is extremely important to the underlying 
doctrine to allow the court to make equitable decisions on a case-by-
case and fact specific basis.100  Holding that attorney’s fees do not 
constitute dissipation reduces the court’s discretionary power because 
a court cannot consider property that no longer exists when making 
its final equitable distribution, unless one spouse dissipated the 
property.101  If a court does not consider attorney’s fees dissipated, it 
cannot evaluate the financial impact of that transaction because the 
court is not allowed to consider the expended asset.102  Such events 
diminish the effectiveness of the court’s discretionary powers, which 
are an integral part of the equity holding.103  A large transaction that 
occurs at the breakdown of the marriage is precisely what the court 
should be allowed to consider.104 
When a court considers attorney’s fees under the dissipation 
doctrine, the court retains its full discretionary power because it is 
then able to consider all of the facts pertaining to the value and 
                                                          
 98. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Wentink, 476 N.E.2d 1109, 1114 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1984) (allowing the trial court to make an unequal division of the estate where the 
husband contributed all earnings to the marriage, but where wife held a non-marital 
estate valued at over $1,000,000 and had future earning capacity given her age and 
education). 
 99. See Brake, supra note 19, at 763 (discussing that the essential element of 
equitable distribution is that it gives the court a tremendous amount of discretion 
because there are few fixed rules for property distribution). 
 100. See In re Marriage of Vernon, 625 N.E.2d 823, 825 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) 
(emphasizing that the touchstone of property distribution was whether or not it was 
equitable and that this will rest on the individual facts of each case). 
 101. See Akers v. Akers, 582 So.2d 1212, 1216-17 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1991) (holding 
that the trial court erred when it included $11,000 that the wife spent on attorney’s 
fees into her equitable share of the estate because the husband did not challenge the 
expenditure as dissipation and therefore the court would not consider the funds in 
the distribution). 
 102. See Brandal v. Shangin, 36 P.3d 1188, 1194-95 (Alaska 2001) (stating that an 
asset that does not exist at the time of trial will not be available for distribution and 
cannot be brought into the court’s consideration, unless there is evidence of 
dissipation). 
 103. See Arp v. Arp, 572 S.W.2d 232, 234-35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that the 
court had a significant amount of discretion and was not just limited by factors listed 
in the statute when making a property distribution). 
 104. See Becker, supra note 30, at 108-09 (stating that one of the policy reasons for 
a court to analyze dissipation around the time of the break down of the marriage is 
that it is a right to protect one spouse from his or her partner’s expenditures that may 
unfairly reduce marital funds). 
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distribution of the marital estate.105  By considering the dissipation 
amount in making an equitable distribution determination, the court 
can still fulfill its function of placing both spouses in a financial 
position sufficient to start over outside of the marriage.106  By 
classifying attorney’s fees as dissipation, the transaction and expended 
assets come before the court as part of the estate that requires 
division.107  The court can automatically consider the transaction and 
the facts and details of the case surrounding it.108  The court still 
retains its discretion on how to make the transaction for attorney’s 
fees out of the marital estate equitable.109  There is no reduction in 
the court’s discretionary power, and this is especially important when 
dealing with the events surrounding the divorce.110 
Divorce is a unique and very costly procedure that can significantly 
affect the financial standing of either spouse.111  Therefore, it is an 
important function of the court to be able to assess the large 
transactions that occur during the breakdown of the marriage and 
decide when to take the extant marital assets into consideration in 
making equitable awards.112  Whereas transactions such as living 
                                                          
 105. See In re Marriage of Weiler, 629 N.E.2d 1216, 1220-23 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) 
(remanding the case for reconsideration of the division of marital assets because the 
lower court failed to consider the dissipation caused by both spouses expending 
$17,000 each in marital funds on attorney’s fees and requiring the court to examine 
and account for these transactions when distributing the estate). 
 106. See Palmer v. Palmer, 841 So.2d 185, 189 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (upholding 
the chancellor’s division of property awarding the wife the marital home and one half 
of her husband’s 401(k) plan due to the fact that her living and medical expenses 
outpaced her income by several hundred dollars a month).  In order to achieve the 
primary goal of equitable distribution, which is the severance of the marriage in a way 
that allows each spouse to begin separate independent lives, the court was justified 
giving the chancellor such discretion. Id. 
 107. See Solomon v. Solomon, 857 A.2d 1109, 1124 (Md. 2004) (noting that if a 
spouse proves dissipation, the court includes the dissipated property as part of the 
marital estate for the court’s consideration in its final award). 
 108. See McCleary v. McCleary, 822 A.2d 460, 468-71 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) 
(remanding the case for reexamination of why the expenditures constituted 
dissipation). 
 109. See In re Marriage of Schriner, 410 N.E.2d 572, 575-76 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) 
(analyzing the dissipation doctrine regarding husband’s expenditures for a new car 
and attorney’s fees around the time his wife left him and holding that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in including these facts in its final distribution of 
property). 
 110. See Booth v. Booth, 371 S.E.2d 569, 572 (Va. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that 
until parties contemplate divorce both spouses are free to spend marital funds; 
however, when the parties opt for divorce, the court needs to accommodate the 
spouses’ conflicting interests using the dissipation doctrine and not allow one spouse 
to unfairly spend marital assets). 
 111. See Alicia Brokars Kelly, Rehabilitating Partnership Marriage as a Theory of 
Wealth Distribution at Divorce:  In Recognition of a Shared Life, 19 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 
141, 161 (2004) (noting that women typically experience a decline of at least thirty 
percent in their standard of living after divorce). 
 112. See Becker, supra note 30, at 101 (stating that the primary purpose of 
17
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expenses are likely to be more routine and less of a drain on the 
estate, attorney’s fees can constitute a major portion of the assets.113  
In marriages where assets are few, attorney’s fees can have an 
enormous impact on what actually appears before the court at the 
time of distribution.114 
2. Holding That Attorney’s Fees are Not Dissipation Creates Inequity 
in the Property Distribution For the Non-Spending Spouse 
As noted, attorney’s fees in equitable distribution states constitute a 
very large expenditure of funds and can significantly reduce the 
marital assets.115  When a spouse’s expenditure on attorney’s fees 
reduces the estate value, the expenditure inevitably reduces the 
amount the other spouse can claim from the remaining estate.116  
The spouse spending funds on attorney’s fees is ultimately put in a 
better financial position if attorney’s fees do not receive dissipation 
status.117  There is not a proportional reduction in that spouse’s share 
of the estate to account for the assets he or she previously spent on 
attorney’s fees, and this effectively spreads the cost of attorney’s fees 
between the two spouses.118  The non-expending spouse, who is in an 
adversarial position to the expending spouse, bears part of the burden 
for an expense that is not in his or her best interests.119  The division 
                                                          
equitable distribution is to reach a fair system of property division; thus a court needs 
to protect one spouse from the other’s transactions that adversely affect his or her 
interests, and dissipation meets this need). 
 113. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum, Rizkallah v. Clem, No. FL 42872, at 6 (Cir. Ct. 
Montgomery County Md. Sept. 6, 2005) (stating that the husband had incurred 
$19,000 in attorney’s fees). 
 114. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Pre-Trial Memorandum, supra note 1, at 5-6 (listing the 
remaining assets the court should consider in distribution, which included only the 
remaining funds from the sale of the house, a truck, trailer, car, ATV, computer, 
camera, various household items and furniture, and outstanding debt). 
 115. See Angel Castillo, Divorce Costs Rise Under New Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 
1981, at A1 (examining the cost of legal fees after the implementation of New York’s 
equitable distribution statute and finding that fees in general rose anywhere from 
twenty to fifty percent under the new law). 
 116. See Booth v. Booth, 371 S.E.2d 569, 573 (Va. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the 
$86,000 that the wife spent on attorney’s fees and living expenses was not a factor that 
the court should consider in the final distribution). 
 117. See Amburn v. Amburn, 414 S.E.2d 847, 848-49 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (refusing 
to deduct wife’s unilateral withdrawal of $95,000, some of which she used to pay her 
attorney’s fees, from her share of the marital estate, thus leaving the wife with a 
significant financial benefit due to the fact that the court did not include the funds 
she spent in the final distribution). 
 118. See Anderson v. Anderson, 514 S.E.2d 369, 380 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) 
(affirming the trial court’s decision that the $15,000 the husband withdrew from a 
marital account worth $18,000, some of which he used to pay attorney’s fees, did not 
constitute dissipation; therefore, only the remainder of the account was subject to 
distribution between the spouses). 
 119. See Akers v. Akers, 582 So.2d 1212, 1216-17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) 
(holding that the court should not exclusively include the $11,000 the wife spent 
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is not truly equitable if it reduces one spouse’s share as a result of the 
other spouse’s payment for an attorney to protect individual 
interests.120 
3. Holding That Attorney’s Fees are Not Dissipation Uses the Doctrine 
For an Incorrect Legal Purpose Against The Spending Spouse 
The ultimate purpose of permitting dissipation claims is not solely 
to punish one spouse for economic misconduct but to allow for the 
most equitable and fair distribution of property.121  Courts should 
view dissipation as a tool to achieve equity and, therefore, a doctrine 
sharing the policy and purpose supporting equitable distribution.122  
Courts that determine attorney’s fees do not constitute dissipation 
restrict the idea of dissipation to a mere deterrent of economic 
misconduct, whereas a broader view of dissipation allows a court to 
consider all of the facts surrounding the divorce to achieve an 
equitable outcome.123  Classifying the dissipation doctrine in a narrow 
way is erroneous.  Punishment should not be the object of dissipation 
because it is a factor of consideration in the no-fault context of 
equitable distribution, where equity is the overriding purpose of the 
doctrine.124  A spouse does not have to intend economic harm for the 
dissipation to have occurred.125  Dissipation is not a punishment tool; 
                                                          
from marital funds for her attorney’s fees in her distributive share of the assets, 
thereby spreading the cost of her attorney’s fees between the husband and wife). 
 120. See id. (refusing to include the amount expended by wife on attorney’s fees 
from the marital funds when making the distribution of assets where the court 
referred to the divorce as bitter and protracted). 
 121. See TURNER, supra note 15, at 467-68 (stating that states agree that an 
innocent spouse who does not dissipate assets needs to receive a remedy after the 
dissipation takes place to make the property distribution fair). 
 122. See Henry H. Foster, Commentary on Equitable Distribution, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. 
L. REV. 1, 58 (1981) (stating that the objective of dissipation is restitution and not 
punishment). 
 123. Compare Allison v. Allison, 864 A.2d 191, 195-96 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) 
(holding that attorney’s fees do not constitute dissipation because they do not 
demonstrate economic misconduct and therefore do not need to be remedied), with 
Head v. Head, 523 N.E.2d 17, 21 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that attorney’s fees did 
constitute dissipation, but that whether a particular course of conduct would 
constitute dissipation would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the 
particular case and whether the conduct requires judicial remedy to make the 
distribution equitable). 
 124. See WEITZMAN, supra note 17, at 29 (discussing that in the no-fault context of 
divorce there is no punishment or reward for either party and that both spouses 
benefit when the court considers economic situations instead of guilt or innocence in 
the property distribution). 
 125. See In re Marriage of Jerome and Martinez, 625 N.E.2d 1195, 1210 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1994) (maintaining that once the wife alleging dissipation showed that the 
husband had exclusive control over and spent the funds in his possession, his general 
and vague statements accounting for how the money was spent were not enough to 
avoid the court holding that dissipation occurred). 
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it is a tool for achieving equity between the two parties with 
conflicting interests.126  A court should not punish a spouse for 
spending marital funds towards attorney’s fees, but it should 
adequately allocate the assets spent by a spouse to his or her share of 
the divided marital estate.127  The doctrine of dissipation allows the 
court to account for these assets as though they still existed and to 
make a significantly more equitable division that does not strive to 
punish one spouse but ensures the fair outcome of the divorce to 
both spouses in light of the surrounding circumstances.128 
4. Holding That Attorney’s Fees Are Not Dissipation Inappropriately 
Restricts a Spouses Ability to Make a Dissipation Claim 
Jurisdictions that do not consider attorney’s fees dissipation will 
only allow such a claim if the alleging spouse can show that the fees 
were unreasonable.129  The creation of this exception, in an effort to 
allow the court to exercise discretion, actually has the opposite 
effect.130  Courts that require a showing that attorney’s fees are 
unreasonable before classifying the transaction as dissipation create a 
higher initial burden of proof, making it more difficult for the spouse 
alleging dissipation to shift the burden.131  Instead of requiring a 
spouse to show that the expenditure is for a non-marital purpose, he 
                                                          
 126. See Foster, supra note 122, at 58 (reasoning that dissipation is not a 
punishment tool but one for restitution for the detrimentally affected spouse). 
 127. See DeLarco v. DeLarco, 728 N.E.3d 1278, 1283-84 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) 
(remanding the case to the trial court to determine the amount the husband 
expended from marital assets for his attorney). Given that the wife borrowed money 
from her father to pay for attorney’s fees rather than paying for them out of marital 
assets, equity required that the husband’s expenditures for attorney’s fees be 
considered an advance against his share of the estate. Id. 
 128. See Head, 523 N.E.2d at 21-22 (upholding the trial court’s property 
distribution which held that the husband had dissipated assets that he spent on 
attorney’s fees and concluding that an unequal division of marital assets was 
warranted when the husband created a trust for the children that reverted back to his 
possession, used marital assets without his wife’s knowledge, and loaned $6000 to his 
brother out of marital funds). 
 129. See Booth v. Booth, 371 S.E.2d 569, 573-74 (Va. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that 
the wife’s attorney’s fees did not constitute dissipation because the husband failed to 
make any allegation that the fees were unreasonable and the trial judge recognized 
that the attorney’s fees incurred by the wife were necessary). 
 130. See Allison v. Allison, 864 A.2d 191, 196 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (holding 
that dissipation should provide a remedy only when a court decides that the 
attorney’s fees are unreasonable). 
 131. Compare DeLarco, 728 N.E.2d at 1284 (holding that husband’s attorney’s 
fees were dissipation because they were expenditures from the marital estate for a 
purpose unrelated to the marriage when the marriage had broken down irregardless 
of the size of the expenditure), with Booth, 371 S.E.2d at 573-74 (holding that 
dissipation occurs where marital funds are spent for a purpose unrelated to the 
marriage for one spouse’s benefit when the marriage is in jeopardy, but that in order 
for attorney’s fees to constitute dissipation a trial judge would be required to find that 
the fees were excessive or unreasonable). 
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or she must now show that the attorney’s fees were unreasonable, 
having no clear indication of what constitutes unreasonable fees.132  
The correct and judicially established prima facie case for dissipation 
requires the alleging spouse to show that the funds are not properly 
accounted for or that the purpose of the transaction is not a typical 
marital expenditure.133  However, now the alleging spouse must not 
only show where the other spouse spent the money but also that the 
fees themselves were unreasonable.134  Attorney’s fees are more than 
likely well-documented expenditures, and, therefore, without a clear 
judicial direction on what would or would not constitute 
unreasonable fees, it becomes a much more difficult case to make for 
a spouse alleging dissipation.135 
C. Dissipation is the Best Judicial Tool to Retain Equity When Funds 
Are Spent On Attorney’s Fees As Compared to Other Remedies at 
Common Law 
Other equitable remedies are available in lieu of applying the 
dissipation doctrine to transactions for divorce attorney’s fees in order 
to make the property distribution equitable.136 However, further 
analysis of each of these remedies reveals that they will not apply to a 
majority of typical divorce circumstances and, therefore, are far less 
effective tools for accounting for unilateral attorney’s fees 
expenditures.137  Each of these doctrines allow the court to account 
                                                          
 132. See Allison, 864 A.2d. at 196 (holding that dissipation should provide a 
remedy when attorney’s fees are unreasonable, but failing to define what would make 
attorney’s fees unreasonable). 
 133. See In re Marriage of Partyka, 511 N.E.2d 676, 680 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) 
(holding that dissipation occurred where husband’s explanations for his expenditures 
were vague); Mika v. Mika, 728 S.W.2d 280, 284 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (concluding that 
evidence of the husband’s expenditure of $3,500 on another woman after separation 
from his wife was sufficient to find that dissipation had occurred). 
 134. See Booth, 371 S.E.2d at 572-73 (ruling that the trial judge may have held that 
the attorney’s fees constituted waste if the husband had made a sufficient attempt to 
prove that the fees were excessive or unreasonable, but noting the fact that the 
money was expended for attorney’s fees did not in itself prove dissipation). 
 135. See Memorandum of Laura Rizkallah, supra note 8, at 9-11 (modifying 
plaintiff’s dissipation claim by arguing that the husband’s attorney’s fees were 
unreasonable because the fees resulted from a faulty legal position and further 
explaining why the husband’s legal position was incorrect). The plaintiff previously 
argued that the attorney’s fees should constitute dissipation without regard to their 
reasonableness. Id. 
 136. See TURNER, supra note 15, at 467-70 (setting out the elements of fraud and 
constructive trust as remedies a court may employ in given situations to retain equity 
in the divorce). 
 137. See Gaudio v. Gaudio, 580 A.2d 1212, 1223 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990) (requiring 
that a spouse prove that there was fraudulent intent in order for the court to hold 
that a particular transaction was fraudulent); Owings v. Currier, 47 A.2d 743, 748-49 
(Md. 1946) (holding that the court will only implement a constructive trust where a 
confidential relationship between parties exists and that Maryland will not assume 
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for attorney’s fees expended on the divorce; however, dissipation 
affords the best method by which to bring the expended assets into 
the court’s distribution because it permits more discretion that can be 
applied to many different fact patterns.138 
1. Constructive Trust 
The first equitable remedy used to achieve a result similar to 
dissipation is the remedy of constructive trust.  Implementation of a 
constructive trust over the assets a spouse spent on attorney’s fees 
usually requires finding that a specific fiduciary duty or a confidential 
relationship exists between the spouses.139  This can be difficult to 
prove because not all jurisdictions assume that the confidential 
relationship applies to marriage.140  Thus, a spouse seeking a 
constructive trust must prove not only that the divorce attorney’s fees 
unjustly enriched the other spouse, but also that a confidential 
relationship and duty existed between spouses with respect to the 
maintenance of the particular asset expended for the fees.141  
Furthermore, the issue of control of the asset comes into question, as 
a constructive trust is not likely to come into use by the court if both 
spouses had access to, or a say in, the maintenance of the asset. 142 
Constructive trusts are primarily a useful tool in cases where one 
spouse had exclusive control of a particular marital asset.143  However, 
                                                          
that such a relationship exists without evidence beyond that of the existence of a 
marriage). 
 138. See TURNER, supra note 15, at 468-70 (reasoning that fraud will not constitute 
a sufficient claim if the spouse cannot prove the fraudulent intent of the other spouse 
and third party and that a constructive trust will only apply in very limited factual 
situations). 
 139. See Tedesco v. Tedesco, 683 A.2d. 1133, 1144 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) 
(holding that a spouse must establish that a confidential relationship exists in order 
to impose a constructive trust); Patterson v. Patterson 277 S.E.2d 709, 716 (W.Va. 
1981) (holding that in order for the wife to prove that marital assets transferred to 
her daughter belong in a constructive trust, a plaintiff must prove that the husband 
accomplished the transfer through a breach of implicit fiduciary duty that the 
husband owed his wife). 
 140. See Owings, 47 A.2d at 748-49 (asserting that Maryland does not automatically 
assume that a confidential relationship exists in transactions between spouses). 
 141. See Bell v. Bell, 379 A.2d 419, 421-22 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (holding that 
in order to find the existence of a confidential relationship, a court will consider 
factors such as age, mental condition, education, business experience, and the degree 
of dependence of one spouse on the other). 
 142. See McClellan v. McClellan, 451 A.2d 334, 339 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982) 
(refusing to implement a constructive trust where the wife understood the property 
division in the separation agreement that she signed and where the evidence showed 
that she handled the family finances and participated in negotiations over the 
agreement’s terms). 
 143. See Tomaino v. Tomaino, 68 A.D.2d 267, 268-69 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) 
(finding that a constructive trust existed where the husband and wife purchased a 
marital home that was titled in the husband’s name, and the wife relied on her 
husband’s promise that the funds she put toward the home would be used for her 
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a spouse seeking the implementation of a constructive trust as an 
equitable remedy must be able to establish not only unjust 
enrichment, but also that the enrichment resulted from of a breach of 
a confidential relationship and duty.144 
In contrast, a spouse seeking judicial recognition of dissipation only 
needs to show that the other spouse benefited, akin to unjust 
enrichment, without having the additional burden of proving that 
there was a confidential relationship.145  Both remedies provide the 
court with means to make an equitable outcome regarding the 
attorney’s fees expenditure.  Dissipation, however, requires less 
judicial effort by the court to reach an equitable outcome.146 
2. Preliminary Injunctions 
Another equitable remedy that a spouse can seek to preserve 
marital assets is a preliminary injunction.  Preliminary injunctions are 
available in most jurisdictions in order to prevent possible dissipation 
of marital assets.147  A spouse can seek a preliminary injunction to 
stop the other spouse from using marital funds to pay for individual 
attorney’s fees as an effective way to prevent dissipation before it 
occurs.148  However, this solution is not particularly practical given 
the circumstances of the divorce.149  Many courts are reluctant to 
grant injunctions that risk placing one spouse in a position that 
freezes all of the marital assets.150  The spouse facing a preliminary 
                                                          
benefit as well as his). 
 144. See Patterson, 277 S.E.2d at 715 (noting that a court will only implement 
constructive trusts where the court has an equitable duty to impose one because one 
party will be unjustly enriched by breaching a fiduciary duty). 
 145. See McCleary v. McCleary, 822 A.2d 460, 463 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) 
(holding that a court will find dissipation wherever one spouse spends marital assets 
for individual benefit for a nonmarital purpose when the marriage breaks down, 
without mentioning the violation of any duty owed to the other spouse). 
 146. Compare DeLarco v. DeLarco, 728 N.E.2d 1278, 1284 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) 
(providing an equitable remedy by including the amount that the husband spent as 
part of his share of the marital estate), with Allgood v. Allgood, 473 So.2d 416, 420 
(Miss. 1985) (providing the equitable remedy by ordering the party in control of the 
asset to convey title of the asset to the other party after finding that a constructive 
trust existed). 
 147. See TURNER, supra note 15, at 60 (stating that some states such as West 
Virginia and Colorado have express statutory authority to give preliminary 
injunctions, while in other states it is usually available under the court’s equitable 
powers). 
 148. See Franzese v. Franzese, 436 N.Y.S.2d 979, 981-82 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) 
(holding that a court will grant an injunction when the spouse seeking the injunction 
can show evidence that dissipation of assets is a real risk). 
 149. See generally Little v. Superior Court of Arizona, 884 P.2d 214, 217 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1994) (holding the husband in contempt for violating the preliminary 
injunction for selling his car to obtain money for living expenses and attorney’s fees 
and discussing what was a reasonable expenditure under the preliminary injunction). 
 150. See Kahn v. Kahn, 559 N.Y.S.2d 103, 105 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (recognizing 
23
Acker: All's Fair in Love and Divorce: Why Divorce Attorney's Fees Shoul
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2006
170 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 15:1 
injunction faces the risk of not having access to assets to pay for 
attorney’s fees without violating the injunction.151  Furthermore, 
courts give few guidelines as to what a spouse seeking an injunction 
must show to obtain a preliminary injunction, providing that spouse 
little certainty that he or she will actually be able to acquire one.152  In 
contrast, accounting for attorney’s fees spent by one spouse through 
dissipation protects both spouses from possible harm by permitting a 
spouse to spend money on attorney’s fees while simultaneously not 
depleting the other spouse’s share of the estate; therefore, it provides 
a more effective remedy.153 
3. Fraud 
Another judicial tool that a court could apply in certain divorce 
cases is a claim of fraudulent conveyance.154  In the divorce context, a 
claim of fraud, like dissipation, will effectively remedy a particular 
conveyance that removes property that was available for equitable 
distribution.155 
However, fraud differs from dissipation in two ways.  First, it 
requires the spouse claiming fraud to prove that the other spouse and 
the third party in the conveyance possessed fraudulent intent or 
inadequate consideration.156  Second, unlike dissipation, where the 
court will account for the extant property in its distribution of 
remaining assets, fraud allows the court to void the entire transaction 
                                                          
that in certain situations, such as where a husband held many volatile assets, a 
preliminary injunction could cause more harm than good by freezing these assets). 
 151. See TURNER, supra note 15, at 60 (stating that preliminary injunctions can 
create a significant risk of damage to one spouse due to the fact that situations often 
arise that require the expenditure of marital assets). 
 152. See Kahn, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 104-06 (discussing the split in authority in New 
York over what circumstances warrant the imposition of an injunction and whether it 
was an automatic right or was necessary to prove that a spouse had the ability to or 
was attempting to dispose of assets). 
 153. See In re Marriage of Walls, 925 P.2d 483, 486 (Mont. 1996) (illustrating that 
the wife was able to pay $5000 retainer to her attorney while at the same time 
protecting the husband’s interest in the $5000 of the marital estate through 
dissipation and subsequently including that amount in wife’s share of the estate). 
 154. See TURNER, supra note 15, at 468 (stating that courts have held that 
fraudulent conveyance falls within their equitable powers in the divorce context when 
implementing equitable distribution of property). 
 155. See Gaudio v. Gaudio, 580 A.2d 1212, 1224 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990) (defining 
fraud in the divorce context as whether or not the conveyance resulted in marital 
property being improperly excluded from equitable distribution claims and holding 
that fraud had occurred where the husband transferred stock to a third party in order 
to prevent his wife from reaching the asset). 
 156. See id. at 1223-24 (finding that fraud occurred where a husband and third 
party were involved in a stock transfer with the intent of placing the assets out of the 
reach of the wife and where the third party was not a bona fide purchaser of the 
stock). 
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and restore the actual assets to the marital estate.157  While the second 
difference results in more complete relief than dissipation affords, the 
fact that it requires proof of fraudulent intent makes it inapplicable to 
most situations in which one spouse spends marital assets on 
attorney’s fees.158  In contrast to fraud, if former marital assets end up 
in the hands of a good faith purchaser, dissipation allows the property 
to be considered as part of the estate in a situation where a fraud 
claim would not apply.159 
There will be some situations in which a fraud claim can be made 
when one spouse liquidated particular assets and used the proceeds 
for attorney’s fees.160  However, in a majority of circumstances fraud 
likely will not be a proper claim to bring.161  Therefore, while fraud 
does provide for complete remedy to the situation, its limited 
application results in it being an inefficient judicial tool to account for 
attorney’s fees transactions.162 
D. Policy Implications 
Courts should consider unilateral transactions for attorney’s fees 
dissipation for the purposes of equitable distribution.163  Dissipation, 
as Illinois and other courts have found, is the most effective tool 
through which to account for the transaction, while still maintaining 
the equity of the divorce without punishing either the expending 
                                                          
 157. See id. at 1212 (holding that a party alleging fraud is entitled to the equitable 
remedy of having the transaction set aside, and in this case, setting aside the 
fraudulent stock conveyance until the wife’s judgment was satisfied). 
 158. See DeLarco v. DeLarco, 728 N.E.2d 1278, 1284 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) 
(considering the payments the parties made from marital funds to attorney’s to be 
advances from the marital estate, not fraudulent conveyances). 
 159. See generally Sharp v. Sharp, 473 A.2d 572, 499 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) 
(holding that the Maryland Marital Property Act was designed so that dissipated 
property could be considered in the context of the property distribution where it was 
in the hands of a good faith third party and could no longer be recovered back into 
the estate). 
 160. See Memorandum of Laura Rizkallah, supra note 8, at 3 (claiming that the 
defendant husband committed fraud when he sold the house for less than market 
value without his wife’s knowledge and spent part of the proceeds to pay his 
attorney). 
 161. See TURNER, supra note 15, at 469 (stating that the difficulty with fraudulent 
conveyance is that in many instances it is impossible to prove deliberate fraudulent 
intent of the other spouse and third party). 
 162. See id. at 469-70 (discussing that the disadvantages of the fraud remedy, 
including rescission of the transaction, are outweighed by the disadvantages posed by 
the difficultly of proving fraudulent intent and the inapplicability of fraudulent 
conveyance to cases where a spouse concealed or wasted assets). 
 163. See Kothari v. Kothari, 605 A.2d 750, 752 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1992) 
(holding that although the legislature did not give a definition for dissipation of 
marital property, the concept was “plastic” and designed to fit the facts and needs of 
individual cases). 
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spouse or the non-expending spouse.164  Jurisdictions such as 
Maryland and Virginia should re-evaluate their line of reasoning on 
the attorney’s fees question because it results in a detrimental effect 
on one spouse.165 Attorney’s fees constitute a very large expenditure, 
and because the transaction is made to protect one spouse’s interest 
against that of the other spouse, the court needs a judicial tool 
through which it can take account of the transaction when dividing 
assets.166 
Equitable distribution was created with the welfare of both spouses 
in mind, with special attention given to reducing sex discrimination in 
domestic and family law.167  More often than not, the wife who had 
held the role of homemaker in the marriage was left in dire financial 
straights.168  In developing the doctrine of equitable distribution, 
courts attempted to level the playing field and reduce the economic 
impact that divorce often had on wives.169  It is true that with the 
complex nature of equitable distribution comes a much more 
contestable confrontation between the parties in the division of the 
estate, and spouses need to be able to have access to some form of 
legal counsel.170  However, the need for an attorney came hand in 
hand with the depletion of marital assets to meet that need and can 
                                                          
 164. See In re Weiler, 629 N.E.2d 1216, 1222-23 (Ill. App. 1994) (holding that 
both spouses dissipated assets by expending marital funds on attorney’s fees and 
remanding to the trial court to reconsider the property distribution to account for 
both of the expenditures of both spouses in the equitable award). 
 165. See Allison v. Allison, 864 A.2d 191, 196 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (reducing 
the amount of a 401(k) plan eligible for equitable distribution by $13,000 which was 
spent by the husband on his attorney’s fees effectively lowering the amount of the 
assets his wife received from $14,000 to $7,000); Anderson v. Anderson, 514 S.E.2d 
369, 380 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (allowing husband to expend part of the $15,000 he 
withdrew from marital funds on attorney’s fees without attributing that amount solely 
to his share of the marital estate, effectively reducing the amount of the marital estate 
that the court could distribute). 
 166. See Becker, supra note 30, at 101 (stating that the primary purpose of 
equitable distribution is to serve as a fair system of property distribution, allowing a 
court to protect one spouse against the other spouse’s transactions that adversely 
affect the non-expending spouse’s interest in marital property). 
 167. See Henry H. Foster, Commentary on Equitable Distribution, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. 
L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1981) (stating that one major legislative purpose of New York’s 
equitable distribution statute was to eliminate sex discrimination from family law). 
 168. See Kelly, supra note 111, at 160-62 (stating that while the old title system of 
divorce intended to treat spouses equally, it did not account for the fact that women 
often were not full participants in the paid labor market and were not in the same 
economic position as men). 
 169. See WEITZMAN, supra note 17, at 73 (stating that the New York bar pushed for 
passage of an equitable distribution statute by asserting that wives would benefit from 
judicial discretion under an equitable standard). 
 170. See generally Castillo, supra note 115 (examining the effect that the equitable 
distribution statute has on divorce costs and stating that attorney’s fees have risen 
significantly due to the more complex nature of property distribution and the 
increase in contested factors in property distribution). 
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result in one spouse with no access to funds having to depend on 
other legal alternatives in order to protect his or her interests in the 
estate.171  By holding that attorney’s fees, unless unreasonable, do not 
constitute dissipation, the court creates a situation where one spouse 
will inevitably end up footing the bill for half of the other spouse’s 
attorney’s fees and will receive a much lower amount in distribution 
than he or she in all fairness should receive.172  This can hardly be 
what the legislatures in equitable distribution states had in mind when 
they implemented equitable distribution statutes.173  Courts should 
realign their holdings to conform with the idea that dissipation is not 
a tool strictly for faulting one spouse and punishing economic 
misconduct, but instead is a tool to deal with particular asset reducing 
transactions that the court specifically needs to account for in their 
distribution of assets to prevent inequitable results.174 
CONCLUSION 
Attorney’s fees are a large expenditure, and the impact of these 
transactions is potentially great in terms of what a spouse ultimately 
receives in the final distribution, especially in marriages with very 
limited marital assets.175  Dissipation is a clear and easily implemented 
solution to account for attorney’s fees transactions, and it allows the 
court to maintain equity in divorce.  Dissipation should be utilized in 
this manner to prevent inequitable results from becoming 
commonplace in divorce. 
 
                                                          
 171. See Plaintiff’s Pre-Trial Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1 (showing that the 
wife had to seek the assistance of student attorneys at a law school clinic to represent 
her interests). 
 172. See generally Allison v. Allison, 864 A.2d 191, 196 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) 
(reducing wife’s share of the 401(k) plan by about $6500 or half of the amount of her 
husband’s attorney’s fees). 
 173. See Fields v. Fields, 643 S.W.2d 611, 617 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that 
the legislature intended for a fair division of property through weighing statutory and 
other relevant factors). 
 174. See Becker, supra note 30, at 101 (arguing that the dissipation doctrine 
should extend maximum protection to a spouse’s interest in marital property and 
should be applicable to any conduct that diminishes or adversely affects the marital 
funds eligible for equitable distribution). 
 175. See generally Memorandum of Laura Rizkallah, supra note 8 (illustrating that 
if the court adhered to the Allison decision, Ms. Rizkallah would not be eligible for a 
share of the $19,000 that her husband spent on attorney’s fees using the proceeds 
from the sale of their marital home). 
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